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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of inference in observational studies with time-varying
adoption of treatment. In addition to an unconfoundedness assumption that the potential
outcomes are independent of the times at which units adopt treatment conditional on the units’
observed characteristics, the main restriction underlying our analysis is that the time at which
each unit adopts treatment follows a Cox proportional hazards model. This assumption permits
the time at which each unit adopts treatment to depend on the observed characteristics of the
unit, but imposes the restriction that the probability of multiple units adopting treatment at the
same time is zero. In this context, we study Fisher-style randomization tests of a “sharp” null
hypothesis that there is no treatment effect for all units and all time periods. We first show that
an infeasible test that treats the parameters of the Cox model as known has rejection probability
no greater than the nominal level in finite samples. We then establish that the feasible test
that replaces these parameters with consistent estimators has limiting rejection probability no
greater than the nominal level. These tests rely upon an important implication of the Cox
model that provides a parametric expression for the probability that a particular unit is the
first to adopt treatment conditional on both the observed characteristics and the time of first
treatment. If these probabilities are equal across all units, then our testing procedure reduces
to the randomization test proposed by Abadie et al. (2010). In a simulation study, we examine
the practical relevance of our theoretical results, including robustness to misspecification of
the model for the time at which each unit adopts treatment. Finally, we provide an empirical
application of our methodology using the synthetic control-based test statistic and tobacco
legislation data found in Abadie et al. (2010)
KEYWORDS: Randomization test, synthetic controls, time-varying treatment adoption, sharp null
hypothesis, Cox proportional hazards model, observational data
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the problem of inference in observational studies in which units adopt treat-
ment at varying times and remain treated once adopting treatment. The widespread availability
of data with this type of structure has led to the development of several different methods for
its analysis, including difference-in-differences (Snow, 1855; Card and Krueger, 1993) and, more
recently, synthetic controls (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010; Abadie, 2019). For
a modern overview, see Section 5 of Abadie and Cattaneo (2018); further references are provided
below. In contrast to the literature on difference-in-differences, which has focused largely on the
estimation of certain average effects of the treatment on the outcome of interest, we study Fisher-
style randomization tests of the “sharp” null hypothesis that there is no effect of the treatment on
the outcome of interest for all units and all time periods. This type of null hypothesis has appeared
previously in the literature on synthetic controls (Abadie et al., 2010; Firpo and Possebom, 2018),
but, in contrast to this literature, which has focused primarily on settings in which there is only a
single unit that adopts treatment, our testing procedure exploits the availability of multiple units
that adopt treatment at different times in a novel way that we describe further below.
In addition to an unconfoundedness assumption that the potential outcomes are independent of
the times at which units adopt treatment conditional on observed characteristics, the main restric-
tion underlying our analysis is a survival model for the time at which each unit adopts treatment.
We require, in particular, that the time at which each unit adopts treatment follows a Cox propor-
tional hazards model. This assumption permits the time at which each unit adopts treatment to
depend on the observed characteristics of the unit, but restricts the probability of multiple units
adopting treatment at the same time is zero. For this reason, as discussed further in Remark 2.1
below, we view our methodology as being best suited for settings in which time is measured with
sufficient granularity to make this probability small. Even though the Cox proportional hazards
model is semiparametric, it further implies a parametric restriction on the distribution of the iden-
tity of the unit that first adopted treatment conditional on observed characteristics and the time
of such first treatment adoption. As in Athey and Imbens (2018), our analysis is “design-based” in
the sense that it exploits heavily this more subtle implication of our assumption on the distribution
of the times at which each unit adopts treatment.
In order to motivate our proposed testing procedure, our first result shows that an infeasible
test that treats the parameters of this conditional distribution of the identity of the unit that first
adopted treatment — more succinctly, the “first adopter” — as known has rejection probability
no greater than the nominal level in finite samples. We then establish that the feasible test that
replaces these parameters with consistent estimators has limiting rejection probability no greater
than the nominal level. We emphasize that consistent estimation of these parameters relies upon the
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availability of multiple units that adopt treatment at different times. As mentioned previously, this
feature distinguishes our analysis from some analyses found in the literature on synthetic controls
in which there is only a single treated unit. We also note that our method for establishing this
limiting result is novel in that it relies upon results in Romano and Shaikh (2012) to argue that
the difference in the rejection probabilities of the feasible and infeasible tests tends to zero as the
number of units becomes large.
Our analysis is most closely related to randomization tests that have appeared in the literature
on synthetic controls. If the conditional distribution of the identity of the first adopter in our anal-
ysis is uniform, then our testing procedure reduces to the randomization test proposed by Abadie
et al. (2010). In the same spirit as the literature on sensitivity analysis in observational studies
(Rosenbaum, 1987, 2002), Firpo and Possebom (2018) parameterize this conditional distribution
in order to explore the sensitivity of the testing procedure to deviations from the assumption that
it is uniform. The parameterization used by Firpo and Possebom (2018) resembles our expression
for the conditional distribution of the identity of the unit that first adopted treatment. In this
way, a by-product of our analysis is an alternative viewpoint on their specific parameterization.
Chernozhukov et al. (2019) have also recently proposed randomization tests for synthetic controls,
but their analysis exploits exchangeability assumptions across the temporal dimension, whereas we,
as explained previously, exploit a cross-sectional restriction of our survival model on the conditional
distribution of the identity of the first adopter. Other recent proposals for inference in the context
of synthetic controls include Cattaneo et al. (2019), who propose methods based on concentration
inequalities from the high-dimensional statistics literature, and Li (2019), who propose methods
based on subsampling that are applicable whenever both the number of pre-treatment and number
of post-treatment time periods are large.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our setup and
notation. In particular, there we describe the Cox proportional hazards model that we use to model
the time at which units adopt treatment and the resulting parametric restriction on the distribution
of the identity of the first adopter unit conditional on observed characteristics, and the time of first
treatment adoption. Section 3 contains our main results, beginning with the finite-sample result
for the infeasible test before presenting the large-sample result for the feasible test. In Section 4, we
explore the practical relevance of our theoretical results, including robustness to misspecification
of the model for the time at which each unit adopts treatment. Finally, in Section 5, we provide
an empirical application of our methodology using the synthetic control-based test statistic and
tobacco legislation data found in Abadie et al. (2010). Proofs of all results can be found in the
Appendix.
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2 Setup and Notation
We index units by i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} and time by t ∈ T = {1, . . . , tmax}. Denote by Xi the
time-invariant characteristics of the ith unit. We assume that the treatment status of unit i at
time t is given by
I{t ≥ Ti} , (1)
where Ti ∈ [0,∞) is the time at which unit i adopts treatment. In other words, treatment can not
be “rolled back” once adopted. We further assume that there is no interference between treatment
statuses, so we denote by Yi,t(1) and Yi,t(0) the potential outcomes of unit i at time t under
treatment and control, respectively. The observed outcome of unit i at time t is denoted by Yi,t,
which satisfies
Yi,t = Yi,t(1)I{Ti ≤ t}+ Yi,t(0)I{Ti > t} . (2)
It will be convenient below to adopt the following shorthand notation:
Y (n)(0) = (Yi,t(0) : i ∈ N, t ∈ T)
Y (n)(1) = (Yi,t(1) : i ∈ N, t ∈ T)
Y (n) = (Yi,t : i ∈ N, t ∈ T)
X(n) = (Xi : i ∈ N)
T (n) = (Ti : i ∈ N) .
Note that Y (n) and X(n) are observed, but adoption times may be censored. Indeed, Ti is not
observed whenever Ti > tmax, so only Ti ∨ tmax is observed. In what follows, we will also make use
of
T(1) = min
i∈N
Ti ,
the time at which a unit first adopts treatment, as well I1, the (random) index corresponding to the
first adopter. Note that Assumption 2.2 below will impose that ties occur with probability zero, so
I1 may be defined to be the unique index satisfying TI1 = T(1).
The null hypothesis of interest is the “sharp” null hypothesis that specifies that the treatment
has no effect for all units and all time periods. Using the notation introduced above, we may express
this null hypothesis formally as
H0 : Yi,t(0) = Yi,t(1) for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T . (3)
As mentioned previously, this type of null hypothesis has appeared in the literature on synthetic
controls (Abadie et al., 2010; Firpo and Possebom, 2018).
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Our analysis will require the following assumption:
Assumption 2.1. (Unconfoundedness) (Y (n)(0), Y (n)(1)) ⊥⊥ T (n)∣∣X(n).
A central object in our analysis will be the conditional distribution
I1
∣∣T(1), X(n). (4)
This distribution will be governed by the following additional assumption:
Assumption 2.2. (Proportional Hazards Model) (Ti, Xi), i = 1, . . . , n are i.i.d. and the distribution
of Ti|Xi has density w.r.t. Lebesgue measure such that
lim
δ↓0
1
δ
P
{
t ≤ Ti ≤ t+ δ
∣∣Ti ≥ t,Xi} = λ(t) exp(X ′iβ) ,
where β ∈ B ⊆ Rd.
Finally, in order to facilitate estimation of β, we further impose the following additional conditions:
Assumption 2.3. (Regularity) (i) B is open, convex and bounded; (ii) 0 <
∫ tmax
0 λ(t)dt <∞ ; (iii)
Var[Xi] is positive definite; and (iv) supp(Xi) is bounded.
Remark 2.1. As mentioned previously, an implication of Assumption 2.2 for our purposes is
that the probability of multiple units adopting treatment at the same time is zero. Since in most
empirical applications the time of treatment adoption is only measured discretely, we view our
methodology as being suited to settings in which treatment adoption times are measured with
sufficient granularity so that this probability is small. In our empirical application in Section 5,
for example, Ti denotes the time at which a state adopts tobacco legislation and our data permit
measurement up to the month or even the day of adoption.
3 Main Result
In order to motivate our proposed testing procedure, it is useful first to describe an infeasible test
of (3) that assumes β is known and is level α in finite samples. To this end, denote by
Sn = Sn
(
I1, Y
(n), (T(1) ∨ tmax), X(n)
)
(5)
a test statistic such that large values of Sn provide evidence against (3). While (5) imposes some
restrictions on the form of the test statistic, it accommodates many test statistics used in the
literature, including choices in Abadie et al. (2010) and Firpo and Possebom (2018). See Remark
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3.1 below for further discussion. In order to describe a suitable critical value with which to compare
Sn, we begin with a straightforward implication of the null hypothesis (3) and Assumption 2.1.
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumption 2.1,
Y (n) ⊥⊥ I1
∣∣T(1), X(n), (6)
whenever the null hypothesis (3) holds.
We also note the following characterization of (4), the conditional distribution of the identity of
the first adopter, I1, under Assumption 2.2:
Lemma 3.2. Under Assumption 2.2, P{I1 = i|T(1), X(n)} = ωi,n(β), where
ωi,n(β) =
exp(X ′iβ)∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβ)
. (7)
Importantly, the right-hand side of (7) does not depend on T(1). It is therefore possible to use these
two lemmas to calculate the distribution of Sn conditional on Y
(n), T(1), X
(n) exactly using only
the observed data whenever the null hypothesis (3) holds. Indeed, whenever (3) holds,
P
{
Sn ≤ s
∣∣Y (n), T(1), X(n)} = ∑
1≤i≤n
ωi,n(β)I
{
Sn
(
i, Y (n), (T(1) ∨ tmax), X(n)
)
≤ s
}
, (8)
where ωi,n(β) is given by (7). We again emphasize that the right-hand side of (8) may be computed
using only the observed data. A suitable critical value with which to compare Sn is therefore given
by
cˆn(1− α, β) =
inf
s ∈ R : ∑
1≤i≤n
ωi,n(β)I
{
Sn
(
i, Y (n), (T(1) ∨ tmax), X(n)
)
≤ s
}
≥ 1− α
 . (9)
By construction, the test of (3) that rejects the null hypothesis if and only if Sn exceeds cˆn(1−α, β)
is level α in finite samples. Our feasible test is given by replacing β with
βˆn = arg max
β∈B
∏
1≤i≤n
(
exp(X ′iβ)∑
j∈Ri exp(X
′
jβ)
)1−δi
, (10)
where δi = I{Ti > tmax} is an indicator for censorship of Ti and Ri = {j ∈ N : Tj ≥ Ti} is, in the
language of the survival analysis literature, the “risk set” for unit i. We note that the maximand
on the right-hand side of (10) is the celebrated partial likelihood of Cox (1975). The following
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theorem shows that, under our assumptions, the resulting test, i.e.,
φn = I
{
Sn > cˆn(1− α, βˆn)
}
, (11)
has limiting rejection probability under the null hypothesis no greater than the nominal level.
Theorem 3.1. If Assumptions 2.1–2.3 hold, then the test φn defined in (11) satisfies
lim sup
n→∞
E[φn] ≤ α
whenever the null hypothesis (3) holds.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 involves showing that the difference in the rejection probabilities of
the infeasible and feasible tests tends to zero as n tends to infinity. The desired result then follows
immediately since it is known that the infeasible test has rejection probability no greater than the
nominal level in finite samples. A key step in the argument is to use Lemma A.1 in Romano and
Shaikh (2012) to show that the difference in these rejection probabilities may be linked to the sum
of the differences in ωi,n(β) and ωi,n(βˆn). Even though this bound involves a growing number of
terms, we show that it is possible to control it using a combination of the boundedness of the
support of Xi and the consistency of βˆn.
Remark 3.1. We emphasize that our theory applies to any choice of test statistic Sn that can be
written as in (5), though some choices of test statistics may be preferable in terms of power of the
resulting test. Abadie et al. (2010) suggests, for example, a test statistic of the form∑
t∈T:t≥T(1)∨tmax(YI1,t − Yˆ NI1,t)2∑
t∈T:t<T(1)∨tmax(YI1,t − Yˆ NI1,t)2
, (12)
where Yˆ NI1,t is a linear combination of {Yi,t : i ∈ N \ {I1}}, where the weights are chosen so that
YI1,t ≈ Yˆ NI1,t for t ∈ T with t < T(1) ∨ tmax. Under the sharp null hypothesis, Yˆ NI1,t may therefore be
viewed as an estimator of YI1,t(0) for t ∈ T with t ≥ T(1) ∨ tmax. The weights in the construction
of Yˆ NI1,t represent the combination of the other units that are intended to be used as a control
for I1, i.e. the “synthetic control.” Different choices for these weights have been suggested by
a variety of authors in the literature. Section 2 of Cattaneo et al. (2019) provides a succinct
summary of proposals by Abadie et al. (2010), Hsiao et al. (2012), Doudchenko and Imbens (2016),
Chernozhukov et al. (2018), Ferman and Pinto (2019), and Arkhangelsky et al. (2019). For further
discussion of and contributions to the synthetic control literature, see Abadie and LHour (2017),
Amjad et al. (2018), Athey et al. (2018) and Ben-Michael et al. (2019). Of course, other choices
for Sn are possible, including a simple difference-in-differences test statistic, which we employ in
our simulations in Section 4.
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Remark 3.2. A p-value corresponding to the test in (11) may be defined as
inf{α ∈ (0, 1) : Sn > cˆn(1− α, βˆn)} . (13)
In order to facilitate computation and our subsequent discussion, it is useful to define
pˆn(ω) =
∑
1≤i≤n
ωiI{sn,i ≥ Sn} , (14)
where Sn is defined as in (5), sn,i = Sn(i, Y
(n), (T(1) ∨ tmax), X(n)), and ω is an element of the
n-dimensional simplex. In this notation, the p-value of our test defined in (13) is simply given by
(14) with ω = (ωi,n(βˆn) : i ∈ N).
Remark 3.3. As mentioned previously, if (4), the conditional distribution of the identity of the
first adopter, I1, is uniform, then the test defined in (11) equals the test proposed by Abadie
et al. (2010). Firpo and Possebom (2018) discuss the properties of this test further and explore its
sensitivity to deviations from the assumption that it is uniform. For a certain choice of Sn, they
first parameterize the weights ωi in (14) as
exp(viφ)∑
1≤k≤n exp(vkφ)
, (15)
where vi ∈ {0, 1} is unobserved for all i ∈ N and φ ∈ R and, for an adversarial choice of v = (vi :
i ∈ N), find the smallest value of φ that results in a p-value that differs in a meaningful way from
the same p-value when φ = 0. Despite the apparent similarity between the weights in (15) with
those in (7), we emphasize that Firpo and Possebom (2018) do not derive the weights in (15) from
more primitive assumptions on the time at which each unit adopts treatment like we do here. In
this way, our results provide an alternative viewpoint on their specific parameterization.
Remark 3.4. By considering randomized tests, it is possible to construct a test that has limiting
rejection probability exactly equal to the nominal level under the null hypothesis. This may be
desirable in terms of power, especially when n is small. In particular, the test defined in (11) should
be augmented so that it additionally rejects with probability q when Sn = cˆn(1− α, βˆn), where
q = (1− α)−
∑
1≤i≤n
ωi,n(βˆn)I{sn,i ≤ cˆn(1− α, βˆn)}
with sn,i = Sn(i, Y
(n), (T(1) ∨ tmax), X(n)). Similar modifications are often used in the context of
randomization tests to achieve exactness; see, for example, Lehmann and Romano (2006, Section
15.2.1).
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4 Simulations
In this section, we explore the finite-sample behavior of our proposed testing procedure with a
small simulation study. We first consider in Section 4.1 a situation in which the model for the time
at which units adopt treatment is correctly specified; we then consider in Section 4.2 a situation in
which this model is incorrectly specified.
4.1 Correct Specification
For i ∈ N and t ∈ T, we assume that Yi,t(1) = τ + Yi,t(0), where
Yi,t(0) = ρYi,t−1(0) + δ
√
t+ γXi + i,t (16)
with Xi, i ∈ N i.i.d. with
P{Xi = c} =

0.7 if c = −1
0.2 if c = 0
0.1 if c = 1
,
i,t, i ∈ N, t ∈ T i.i.d. as N(0, 1). Additionally, we set Yi,0(0) = 0 for all i ∈ N, ρ = 0.8, δ ∈
{0, 0.5, 1, 2} and γ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1, 2}. The observed outcome, Yi,t, is given by (2), and treatment
status is given by (1), where Ti|Xi distributed as Exp(λi) with λi = exp(Xiβ) and β = 1. It is
straightforward to verify that this distribution of Ti satisfies Assumption 2.2 with baseline hazard
equal to the hazard function of an exponential distribution with parameter equal to one. We set
n = 100 and tmax = 100.
We specify that Sn in (5) is a difference-in-differences test statistic:
1
tmax − dT(1)e
∑
T(1)<t≤tmax
YI1,t − 1n− 1 ∑
i∈N:i 6=I1
Yi,t

− 1bT(1)c
∑
1≤t<T(1)
YI1,t − 1n− 1 ∑
i∈N:i 6=I1
Yi,t
 . (17)
As mentioned in Remark 3.1, another possible choice would have been a synthetic control test
statistic in (12), but this simpler choice of test statistic facilitates computation as well as some ana-
lytical calculations we present below in Remark 4.1. We emphasize that in our empirical application
in Section 5 we employ a synthetic control test statistic.
In our simulations below, we present rejection probabilities computed using 10,000 replications
for different values of δ and γ under the null hypothesis (3), i.e., with τ = 0. In addition to our
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proposed feasible testing procedure described, we also consider the infeasible test which treats β as
known as well as the test proposed by Abadie et al. (2010). In our discussion, we refer to this test
as the uniform test since it corresponds to our testing procedure with ωi = 1/n for all i ∈ N. The
nominal level of all tests is α = 0.05.
The results of our simulations are presented in Table 1 below. As expected, after accounting for
simulation error, the infeasible test has rejection probability no greater than the nominal level for
any values of δ and γ. In accordance with Theorem 3.1, the feasible test has rejection probability
that is close to that of the infeasible test and therefore does not exceed the nominal level by a
meaningful amount for any values of δ and γ. When γ = 0, i.e., when Xi does not enter (16), the
uniform test also has rejection probability no greater than the nominal level, but, for all other values
of δ and γ, the test exhibits rejection probabilities that exceed the nominal level by a considerable
amount. Indeed, for such values of δ and γ, the rejection probability always exceed 0.08 and in
some cases exceeds twice the nominal level. In Remark 4.1 below, we discuss the performance of
the uniform test when γ = 0 further.
Remark 4.1. A modest amount of calculation shows that under the distributional assumptions
described above the test statistic in (17) may be written as
n
n− 1γ(ρ
+ − ρ−)(X¯n −XI1) + ζ (18)
under the null hypothesis, where
X¯n =
1
n
∑
1≤i≤n
Xi ,
ρ+ =
1
tmax − dT(1)e
∑
T(1)<t≤tmax
ρt/(1− ρ) ,
ρ− =
1
bT(1)c
∑
1≤t<T(1)
ρt/(1− ρ) ,
and ζ is distributed as a normal random variable with mean zero. We note, in particular, that the
difference-in-differences statistic eliminates any dependence on δ, but the effect of γ persists. When
γ = 0, the effect of I1 and Xi are both eliminated from (18), and tests corresponding to any choice
of weights ωi, including the uniform test, will have rejection probability under the null hypothesis
no greater than the nominal level. Of course, when γ 6= 0, this need not be the case, as shown by
the simulation results presented above.
9
δ γ uniform feasible infeasible
0.00 0.00 5.00 4.95 4.80
0.50 0.00 5.09 5.15 5.18
1.00 0.00 4.98 4.78 4.96
2.00 0.00 5.10 5.34 5.02
0.00 0.50 8.42 5.21 5.12
0.50 0.50 8.10 5.14 4.96
1.00 0.50 10.04 4.68 4.74
2.00 0.50 8.62 4.91 4.92
0.00 1.00 8.67 4.78 4.78
0.50 1.00 10.59 5.42 4.53
1.00 1.00 9.69 4.64 4.53
2.00 1.00 9.05 5.15 4.81
0.00 2.00 8.70 5.03 4.74
0.50 2.00 8.82 4.92 4.67
1.00 2.00 9.76 5.67 5.05
2.00 2.00 8.46 5.26 4.98
Table 1: Null rejection probabilities for three tests: uniform, feasible, infeasible. Rejection proba-
bilities are computed using 10,000 replications
4.2 Incorrect Specification
In this section, we explore the robustness of our proposed test to misspecification of Assumption
2.2, i.e., the model for the times at which units adopt treatment. To this end, we first generate
observed data using the model described in Section 4.1 under the null hypothesis. We additionally
compute the weights ωn(βˆn) used in implementing the feasible test discussed in that section. In
order to examine the performance of this test to a wide variety of different types of misspecification
of Assumption 2.2 in a succinct way, we implement the test with weights ω˜ that are misspecified
in the following way:
ω˜ = (1− )ωn(βˆn) + ν ,
where  ∈ [0, 1] now indexes the amount of misspecification and ν is given by either νi = 1/n for
all i ∈ N or ν(i) = ω(n−i),n(βˆn) with indices (1), . . . , (n) corresponding to
ω(1),n(βˆn) ≤ · · · ≤ ω(n),n(βˆn) .
Below we refer to these two choices of ν as “uniform” and “worst”, respectively, where the latter
terminology reflects the fact that such a choice of ν is the most adversarial possible. Following the
discussion in Remark 4.1, we see that δ is irrelevant for the performance of these tests; we therefore
10
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Figure 1: Null rejection probabilities (y-axis) for the feasible test with different amounts of
misspecification indexed by  (x-axis) and two different types of misspecification: uniform and
worst. Rejection probabilities are computed using 10,000 replications.
focus on the effect of γ and . As before, the nominal level of all tests is α = 0.05 and all rejection
probabilities are computed using 10, 000 replications.
These results are summarized in Figure 1. For values of  as high as 0.25, we see that the rejection
probabilities of our feasible test do not exceed the nominal level by an appreciable amount for any
of the values of γ that we consider and either choice of ν. For larger values of , we see that the
rejection probabilities may be significantly above the nominal level, but they remain remarkably
robust. For instance, when γ = 0.1, they never greatly exceed 0.10 for any choice of  and ν. The
deterioration is worse for larger values of γ, which agrees with our discussion in Remark 4.1.
5 Empirical Application
In this section, we apply our proposed test to revisit the analysis in Abadie et al. (2010) of the effect
of tobacco legislation on smoking prevalence. We recall that Abadie et al. (2010) was motivated
by California’s adoption in 1989 of Proposition 99, a large-scale tobacco control program. A main
11
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Figure 2: Annual cigarette packet sales per capita from 1970 to 2015 in select states. Proposition
99 was adopted by California in 1989.
component of this legislation was a steep increase in cigarette packet tax by 25 cents, representing
an increase in taxes of 250%. While smoking prevalence declined after this legislation was adopted,
it is important to emphasize that this decline happened in the backdrop of nationwide declining
smoking prevalence dating at least as far back as the late 1970s. See Figure 2 for a graphical
depiction of these trends for several different states, including California. In this context, Abadie
et al. (2010) used his synthetic control methodology to test the null hypothesis that none of decline
in smoking prevalence observed in California after 1989 can be attributed to the effects of the
Proposition 99. Their analysis rejects this null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.026.
We now describe how we apply our methodology to this setting. To facilitate comparison with
the results in Abadie et al. (2010), we restrict attention to the same n = 39 states in their analysis.
These states are indexed by i ∈ N. We index time by t ∈ T = {“01/1971”, “02/1971”, . . . , “12/2014”},
where we have adopted the “month/year” format and identify 1 with “01/1971” and tmax with
“12/2014”. Denote by Yi,t the number of cigarette packets sold in state i ∈ N at time t ∈ T.
Finally, let Ti denote the time at which state i ∈ N adopts tobacco legislation. Orzechowski and
Walker (2014) provide a comprehensive record of tobacco tax increases across states during this
time period. In order to resolve any ambiguities, we define this to be the first time taxes on
cigarette packets are increased by at least 50%. Every state except for Missouri adopt such to-
bacco legislation in our sample period. In Appendix B, we examine the robustness of our results
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to different ways of defining Ti. In addition, while the data permit measurement of Ti up to the
day of adoption, we simply record the month of adoption. In particular, T(1) = “01/1989”. We
emphasize, however, that no two states adopted tobacco legislation during the same month, so this
is immaterial. Finally, treatment status is then computed as in (1).
Following Abadie et al. (2010), we employ a test statistic like that given by (12) in Remark 3.1.
The weights in the construction of Yˆ NIi,t are computed as follows
w∗ = arg min
w
∑
t∈T:t<T(1)
YI1,t − ∑
j∈N:j 6=I1
wjYj,t
2 , (19)
where the possible values of w are understood to be in the n-dimensional simplex with wI1 restricted
to be equal to zero.
In order to complete the description of our testing procedure, we assume that the times at which
states adopt tobacco legislation is governed by a Cox proportional hazards model as described in
Assumption 2.2, which requires, in particular, a specification of the covariates. We include the
following covariates: per capita income (in logs), average price levels, fraction of population that
are youth (with youth defined to be people with ages between 15 and 24), the unemployment level,
and the fraction of state legislators that are Democrats. We note that these variables are not
time-invariant and change on a yearly basis. While we did not allow for time-varying covariates
in our formal analysis, it is straightforward to include them in a Cox proportional hazards model.
See, for example, the discussion in Chapter 8 of Cox and Oakes (1984). In order to account for
the systematic increase in some of these variables over time, we first de-trend these variables using
a common linear trend across states. We emphasize that our test remains valid because the main
requirement underlying its validity is simply the consistency of βˆn. Before proceeding, we note that
in Appendix B we examine the robustness of our findings to more parsimonious specifications of
the covariates.
For our baseline specification defined by the choices above, we compute a p-value of 0.044. We
therefore reject the null hypothesis (3) at conventional significance levels, such as α = 0.05. In order
to gain some further insight into this result, it is worthwhile to examine the estimated conditional
distribution of the identity of the state that first adopted tobacco legislation, i.e., the distribution
of I1|T(1), X(n). This is presented in Table 2 for our baseline specification. We see that the model of
treatment adoption implies that there are nine states that had higher probability of being the first
to adopt treatment (conditional on the first adoption occurring in January 1989), namely, Nevada,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, North Dakota, Maine, Illinois, Wisconsin, Texas, and Nebraska. In
contrast, states such as Kentucky, Missouri or North Carolina, had much lower probability of
being the first to adopt to adopt treatment (conditional on the first adoption occurring in January
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State Prob. of treatment adoption State State
Nevada 0.1037 Arkansas 0.0250 Virginia 0.0086
Connecticut 0.1018 Pennsylvania 0.0225 Alabama 0.0081
Rhode Island 0.0681 Louisiana 0.0201 West Virginia 0.0066
North Dakota 0.0617 Ohio 0.0200 Oklahoma 0.0037
Maine 0.0605 Delaware 0.0186 South Carolina 0.0033
Illinois 0.0580 Minnesota 0.0171 South Dakota 0.0027
Wisconsin 0.0517 Tennessee 0.0163 Vermont 0.0026
Texas 0.0491 Montana 0.0151 Utah 0.0023
Nebraska 0.0460 Idaho 0.0139 Iowa 0.0018
California 0.0440 Indiana 0.0134 North Carolina 0.0016
New Hampshire 0.0360 Kansas 0.0124 Missouri 0.0014
Wyoming 0.0291 Georgia 0.0124 Kentucky 0.0013
New Mexico 0.0279 Colorado 0.0111 Mississippi 0.0006
Table 2: Estimated conditional distribution of the identity of the state that first adopted tobacco
legislation, i.e., the distribution of I1|T(1), X(n).
1989). Indeed, California was more than 34 times as likely to be the first adopter than Kentucky
(conditional on the first adoption occurring in January 1989). These features reflect differences in
both the characteristics of these states as well as disparities in the time at which different states
adopted treatment. For instance, Mississippi only introduced such tobacco legislation as late as
2009.
We conclude the discussion of our empirical results by noting that had we implemented the
test with ωi = 1/n we would have computed, like Abadie et al. (2010), a p-value of 0.026. This
phenomenon simply reflects the fact that for our specification above Sn(i, Y
(n), (T(1) ∨ tmax), X(n))
is largest for i corresponding to California. As mentioned previously, in Appendix B, we further
examine the robustness of this finding to different ways of defining Ti as well as more parsimonious
choices of covariates in the Cox proportional hazards model. We repeat the analysis for more than
30,000 different resulting specifications and find that in the vast majority of specifications, we still
reject the null hypothesis at the α = 0.05 significance level and in all specifications we reject at the
α = 0.10 significance level. In this sense, we believe our analysis largely confirms the findings in
Abadie et al. (2010).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Assumption 2.1 and (3) implies that
Y (n) ⊥⊥ T (n)|X(n) .
The desired conclusion (6) now follows immediately upon noting that I1 and T(1) are functions of T
(n).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Note that
P{I1 = i|T(1) = t,X(n)} = P{Ti = t|T(1) = t,X(n)}
= lim
δ↓0
P{t ≤ Ti ≤ t+ δ|t ≤ T(1) ≤ t+ δ,X(n)}
= lim
δ↓0
P{t ≤ Ti ≤ t+ δ|Xi}
∏
1≤j≤n:j 6=i P{Tj ≥ t|Xj}∑
1≤k≤n P{t ≤ Tk ≤ t+ δ|Xk}
∏
1≤j≤n:j 6=k P{Tj ≥ t|Xj}
= lim
δ↓0
P{t ≤ Ti ≤ t+ δ|Ti ≥ t,Xi}∑
1≤k≤n P{t ≤ Tk ≤ t+ δ|Tk ≥ t,Xk}
= lim
δ↓0
1
δP{t ≤ Ti ≤ t+ δ|Ti ≥ t,Xi}∑
1≤k≤n
1
δP{t ≤ Tk ≤ t+ δ|Tk ≥ t,Xk}
=
λ(t) exp(X ′iβ)∑
1≤k≤n λ(t) exp(X
′
kβ)
,
where the first equality follows by inspection, the second equality is understood to be by definition, the third
through fifth equalities follow from Bayes’ rule, and the sixth equality follows from Assumption 2.2. The
desired conclusion now follows immediately.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first note that, under Assumptions 2.2–2.3, it follows from the discussion on page 55 of Kosorok (2008)
that βˆn
P→ β as n → ∞. In what follows, make use of the notation ∆ˆn = βˆn − β and a . b for a ≤ cb for
some constant c. Before proceeding, note that Assumption 2.3 implies that
0 < inf
x∈supp(Xi)
exp(x′β) ≤ sup
x∈supp(Xi)
exp(x′β) <∞ . (20)
Similarly, Assumption 2.3 implies that
sup
x∈supp(Xi)
∣∣∣exp(x′∆ˆn)− 1∣∣∣ = oP (1) . (21)
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Now, note that
sup
s∈R
∣∣∣∣∣∣P
{
Sn ≤ s|Y (n), (T(1) ∨ τ), X(n)
}
− 1
n
∑
1≤i≤n
ωi,n(βˆn)I
{
Sn
(
i, Y (n), (T(1) ∨ τ), X(n)
)
≤ s
}∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
≤
∑
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣ωi,n(β)− ωi,n(βˆn)∣∣∣
≤ sup
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣∣∣ exp(X ′iβ)1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβ)
− exp(X
′
iβˆn)
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβˆn)
∣∣∣∣∣
= sup
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
exp(X ′iβ)
(
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβˆn)
)
− exp(X ′iβˆn)
(
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβ)
)
(
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβ)
)(
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβˆn)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= sup
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
exp(X ′iβ)
((
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
k∆ˆn) exp(X
′
kβ)
)
− exp(X ′i∆ˆn)
(
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβ)
))
(
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβ)
)(
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
k∆ˆn) exp(X
′
kβ)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
. sup
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
((
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
k∆ˆn) exp(X
′
kβ)
)
− exp(X ′i∆ˆn)
(
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβ)
))
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
k∆ˆn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= sup
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
((
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n
(
exp(X ′k∆ˆn)− 1
)
exp(X ′kβ)
)
−
(
exp(X ′i∆ˆn)− 1
)(
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n exp(X
′
kβ)
))
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n
(
exp(X ′k∆ˆn)− 1
)
+ 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= oP (1) .
where the first inequality exploits (8), the second inequality exploits (7), the first and second equalities
follow by inspection, the third inequality exploits (20), the third equality follows by inspection, and the final
equality exploits (20)–(21). The desired result now follows by applying Lemma A.1 in Romano and Shaikh
(2012).
B Additional Specifications for Empirical Application
In this section, we examine the robustness of our empirical findings in Section 5. Specifically, we re-compute
our p-value for different ways of defining Ti as well as exclusion of some of the six covariates we include in
our Cox proportional hazards model.
As mentioned in Section 5, we define Ti to be the first time at which a state increased taxes on cigarette
packets by at least 50%. While this eliminates any ambiguity, we identify nine states for which an alternative
choice of Ti seems reasonable based subjectively on the magnitude or timing of the increase. These nine
states are indicated in bold face in Table 3. For each of those states, we indicate in the column labeled
‘Specification B’ the choice of Ti corresponding to our specification in Section 5 and the alternative choice
in the column labeled ‘Specification A’. For all other states, we simply repeat in these two columns the
single choice of Ti that we consider. By considering all possible choices of Ti for these nine states, we obtain
29 = 512 possible specifications of Ti. For each of these specifications, we additionally consider each of
the 26 = 64 possible subsets of the six covariates to include in the Cox proportional hazards model. We
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of (p-value,AIC) across all specifications.
therefore obtain in total 512 × 64 = 32, 768 possible specifications. In order to facilitate our discussion
below, we compute, in addition to the p-value for our test, the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) for each
Cox proportional hazards model.
In Figure 3, we plot for each of these specifications the (p-value,AIC). We see that in the vast majority
of cases, we continue to reject the null hypothesis at the α = 0.05 significance level. This conclusion is further
strengthened if we restrict attention to specifications with better (i.e., lower) values of AIC. Finally, in all
specifications, we reject the null hypothesis at the α = 0.10 significance level. Indeed, the maximum p-value
across all specifications is 0.072. In this sense, we find that our findings in Section 5 and, by extension, those
of Abadie et al. (2010) are remarkably robust.
17
State Specification A Specification B
1 Alabama 05/2004 05/2004
2 Arkansas 06/2003 02/1993
3 California 01/1989 01/1989
4 Colorado 01/2005 01/2005
5 Connecticut 04/1989 04/1989
6 Delaware 01/1991 08/2003
7 Georgia 07/2003 07/2003
8 Idaho 07/1994 06/2003
9 Illinois 07/1989 07/1989
10 Indiana 07/2002 07/2002
11 Iowa 04/2007 04/2007
12 Kansas 07/2002 07/2002
13 Kentucky 06/2005 06/2005
14 Louisiana 08/2002 08/2002
15 Maine 11/1997 07/1991
16 Minnesota 06/1991 08/2005
17 Mississippi 05/2009 05/2009
18 Missouri 12/2014 12/2014
19 Montana 05/2003 05/2003
20 Nebraska 10/2002 10/2002
21 Nevada 07/1989 07/1989
22 New Hampshire 02/1990 02/1990
23 New Mexico 07/2003 07/2003
24 North Carolina 09/2005 09/2005
25 North Dakota 05/1989 05/1989
26 Ohio 07/2002 07/2002
27 Oklahoma 01/2005 01/2005
28 Pennsylvania 08/1991 08/1991
29 Rhode Island 07/1997 07/1993
30 South Carolina 07/2010 07/2010
31 South Dakota 03/2003 07/1995
32 Tennessee 07/2002 07/2002
33 Texas 07/1990 07/1990
34 Utah 07/1991 07/1997
35 Vermont 07/1995 07/1995
36 Virginia 09/2004 09/2004
37 West Virginia 05/2003 05/2003
38 Wisconsin 05/1992 05/1992
39 Wyoming 07/2003 07/1989
Table 3: Different specifications for Ti.
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